The 2024-25 FPL Global Champion, Croatia's Lovro Budišin, enjoyed a truly exceptional year in the game. It wasn't quite the highest total ever (second best, I think?), but it was the only one above 2,800 points this year (and only 137 others managed to reach 2,700; despite the substantial points lift available from the 'Assistant Manager' novelty chip, it was overall a rather low-scoring year on average - which makes Lovro's performance even more of an outlier), and he finished a fairly comfortable 23 points clear of the runner-up. The really remarkable thing, though, is the degree and duration of his dominance: he spent almost the entire second half of the season in the overall Top Ten, and the final 8 weeks straight at No. 1. I don't think that's ever been done before!
So,... Congratulations to Lovro Budišin! But how on earth did he accomplish this - what were the key decisons during the season that anabled him to gain such unprcedented success??
I was surprised to see that he got off to a somewhat rocky start; indeed, he almost plummeted out of the top 3 million after a very poor Gameweek 4. I noted in my 'Review of the Year' a little while back that it really hurt to be without Erling Haaland during that record-breaking early points-spree of his over the first 5 gameweeks: missing out on that 63-point bonanza looked like a near-irrecoverable sertback, likely to prove fatal to most FPL managers' hopes; yet Lovro had staked his colours to the No-Haaland strategy at the start of the season, and bravely stuck to that.
It didn't look a great initial squad in many other ways, either: he'd gone very light on the bench, with three weak and irregular starters (he was one of many who took a punt on Jarrell Quansah getting a run of starts for Liverpool early in the season, only to see Slot grow disenchanted with him after the first 45 minutes against Ipswich...), and a non-playing keeper. He'd also - rather sentimentally? - gone for Son (who only managed 3 decent hauls in the first 8 games, which still didn't add up to a very impressive ppg average) and Bruno Fernandes (who did nothing much for the first 9 gameweeks...) in his midfield, rather than Palmer and Saka - who both started super-hot; and he had Nkunku in his fifth seat! However, one of Lovro's 'secrets' this season was that even his 'bad weeks' weren't usually too bad: despite missing out on the big early points from Saka, he'd got good initial returns in GW1 from Havertz and Wood (who weren't the most obvious forward picks for the initial squad), and from Diogo Jota, putting him only just outside the top 300,000.
He quickly repented of most of his more dubious initial picks, but held off going for an early Wildcard (fair enough, perhaps, when the team was still turning in strong scores for him almost every week - although I would say that he ultimately left it a bit too long): he dumped out Nkunku immediately for Morgan Rogers, than Quansah for Konsa, then (rather more quirkily, since Isak had just scored, while Watkins had also started the season in frail form) Watkins for Isak; then, over the succeeding weeks, he swapped Mbeumo in for Jota, Saka for Bruno Fernandes, Foden for Son, and Solanke for Havertz. Foden, of course, turned out to be a poor choice; and although Solanke produced a nice 16-point haul against Villa in GW10, and another half-decent little run a little later from GW15-17 (by which time Lovro had already abandoned him again) neither was Solanke. He was also very late to get his hands on Mbeumo and Saka, who really had a nearly overwhelming case for inclusion from the start of the season. And he didn't finally acquire Cole Palmer until he played his first Wildcard in Gameweek 12; although he got another 5 double-digit hauls out of the Chelsea youngster, he'd already missed out on his hottest streak of the season - 79 points from the first 9 games. And he didn't let Palmer go again until GW33, which was probably much too late (even worse: he actually blew two transfers in moving Palmer out for his blank fixture in Gameweek 29 and then immediately reinstating him the following week).
He continued to struggle a bit with his forward choices too. Cunha, just starting to show some form when introduced in Gameweek 10, seemed quite a shrewd selection; although it mght perhaps have been done at the expense of someone other than Chris Wood, who continued to play well through a sticky patch of fixtures following. Bringing in Hojlund for Watkins the following week was a real headscratcher, though (and he repented of it immediately, dropping him for Joao Pedro on his Wildcard the following week; Pedro delivered him a nice haul that week, but did nothing subsequently and was himself dumped within 5 weeks.... for Gabriel Jesus??!!). And it didn't show much forethought - or patience - to bring Bruno Fernandes back in on that Wildcard when he was facing a tricky set of upcoming fixtures: Lovro dropped him again, for Jarrod Bowen, just two weeks later (despite him having just picked up a 9-point haul in GW13,.. and being about to repeat the feat in good performances against faltering Forest and City!). Overall, not a great first Wildcard - with Cunha, Saka, and Joao Pedro producing nicely in that first week (and Saka also the following week), but then lapsing into a string of blanks again (Joao Pedro not really doing that much more all season; Cunha subsequently having his impact blighted by the two extended suspensions in fairly quick succession...). With the urgent case for bringing in Palmer, Mbeumo, Saka, and perhaps Bowen, and a few others in other positions too, he probably should have gone for that first rebuild quite a bit earlier.
However, Lovro was one of the beneficiaries of the FA's uncommonly lenient treatment of Cunha over his assaulting a member of the public after a tetchy match against Ipswich in GW16. It had seemed likely (and appropriate!) that Cunha would receive an immediate and lengthy ban for this incident, and it was reasonable to have dumped him out in anticipation - in order to avoid suffering from a major price-drop on him. But, astonishingly, it took the powers-that-be a few weeks to render judgement at all, and then they incredibly let the Brazilian off with the token wrist-slap of a one-game ban from the EPL. He produced rather nicely through that spell as well, massively - but somewhat unjustly - rewarding those who'd taken a huge risk in hanging on to him.
There were a number of times Lovro appeared to have a crystal ball - bringing in players who would produce really well for him a few times, maybe just the once; somehow being able to bring them in at an opportune moment, and then offload them again at just the right time... often without any clear triggers for those decisions in what was happening on the pitch. To give just one example, was a solitary goal against Villa enough to bet on Phil Foden from Gameweek 18, when City had been looking so abject throughout November and December? And although they had a tougher set of fixtures coming in February, was that enough reason to drop him again - after Pep's men had shown signs of a renaissance at the turn of the year, and Foden had been on fire for a spell? Had Lovro somehow foreseen that Foden would abruptly fall out of favour with Pep and get only limited minutes for the rest of the season?? 'Good judgment' of form/fixtures can't justify here how he came to transfer in one of the season's great under-performers for the five games in which he produces 55 points!!
This is how it goes, sometimes; this is the essence of the whole game. There is no single, unversally accepted 'template' (as so many regular FPL managers delusionally choose to believe): for almost every position in the team (not Salah's, obviously; not this year...) there are almost always at least two or three justifiable selections - occasionally, quite a few more than that for the crucial last few spots in the lineup. And your overall success is determined by the number of weeks in which you happen to have THE ONE who produces enormously in a given position that week - or rather, how many of THE ONES you have, since most of us have at least one or two of them nearly every week. And there's not really a lot of skill in that. Most of Lovro's highest-returning picks (most of any of the best picks for any one of us!) were not obviously standouts for that particular week, or were in fact clearly non-ideal over a slightly longer run of games. Happening to have been on them for that game or two (or, in a rare case, three or four games in fairly quick succession) is mostly LUCK.
Remember how rarely you come across a player in your side who notches 15 points or more in a gameweek? By my count, Lovro had 17 - apart from Salah. I haven't been able to turn up the season total stat for that, but he must have been on close to all of them; well an unusually high percentage of them, anyway. And that's an arbitrary cut-off point, of course: I noticed he had an uncommonly large number of players coming in just under that with 14-point returns for the week as well; and a great many 10-pointers...
Lovro was decidedly flawed and fallible in this incredible season of his. He made quite a number of objectively poor choices. He left a few high-scoring players on his bench here and there. He missed out on the most productive spells from Palmer, Mbeumo, Saka, Bowen, Kluivert, Eze. And I think he failed to capitalise on some briefly very high-earning players like Amad Diallo, Alex Iwobi, Dango Ouattara, Enzo Fernandez and Harvey Barnes altogether. Yet somehow, over and over again, he had three, four, five double-digit players in his team. And he only slipped below the global average three times, in Gameweeks 4, 20, and 27. (I would guess - from my own experience! - that 6-8 times per season is more typical, for reasonably good managers.)
He was perhaps even more blessed in his captaincy picks. Of course, the amazing consistency of Mo Salah this year made it quite a bit easier for everyone: he was the FPL 'Player of the Week' a remarkable 11 times in the first 28 games. However, he did blank here and there; and there were other players who hit even hotter form from time to time, albeit in shorter spells - most people would have been tempted to try someone other than Mo Salah on occasion. Lovro only missed out on one of those weeks that Mo was the game's highest scorer! And he didn't suffer too badly in that one, since his preferred alternative, Song Heung-Min, came up with a pretty decent score for him in GW2!! Nor did he suffer from sticking with Salah 'too much', as the Egyptian marvel only blanked for him as captain twice. His success with the captaincy faltered in the later stages of the season, but through into February, he was rarely going astray: 14 times in the first 28 Gameweeks, he correctly handed the armband to his highest-returning player (and a couple of them weren't Salah); and 4 more times his captain pick was a fairly close second-place returner in this period (and twice more again in the closing 10 weeks). That is an utterly freakish rate of success with captaincy selection, and is possibly the biggest single element of his astonishing lead over the field this season.
Now, sure, there is an element of 'skill' in choosing your captain; but there's a very large component of luck as well in getting returns like that. It's difficult to discern why he would have been confident in Son as captain against Everton in GW2 after Spurs had stumbled to a draw against Leicester in the opening week (it was a non-ideal pick, compared to Salah; but it still did very well for him), or in Palmer in GW13, after Chelsea had only managed an unconvincing win against Leicester the week before, and after struggling to draws against Arsenal and Manchester United in the two previous games - in all three of which, Palmer had blanked. But for most of the first six months or so of the season, he could do no wrong....
However, a lot of this was just down to choosing players who would produce one or two good returns almost immediately; very few of his picks actually worked out well for any more extended period. Consequently, his squad value (which, I think, is one of the most revealing indirect measures of how well you're managing your squad - how well you time your transfers, how early you're spotting emerging form/talent, how promptly you bin players whose returns are drying up, etc.) was very slow to grow, especially early in the season. It took him until GW16 to reach a value of 104 million, and he'd only just dragged himself up to 106 million by the end of the season - which is a pretty respectable final total, but by no means stellar.
And in his chip play - usually considered the prime marker of 'skill' in FPL - Lovro really wasn't so impressive this year. I already mentioned above that his first Wildcard was a bit of a mixed-bag: probably played a bit too late (after realising that he was missing 3 or 4 of the highest-returning midfielders, any Arsenal defenders, or any decent goalkeepers in his initial squad), and the new signings not all being that impressive (he still didn't have a strong keeper pair, and two of his new players were abandoned again within just a few weeks - on form/fixture grounds rather than because of injury). His second in GW30 wasn't much better, with Areola for Henderson being a pointless-looking change (other than for cost-saving, which wasn't really an issue by that stage of the season), as was the reintroduction of Palmer; and the acquisition of Livramento (although, yet again for lucky Lovro, he came up with a BIG haul out of nowhere the following week, before lapsing into anonymity again for the remainder of the season); and he was a little late to the party with Eze and Murphy and Mateta. The week he played that, Gameweek 30, was actually one of his worst of the whole season - only scraping home 1 point above a very low global average.
He opted to use a 'hit' and put out a 10-man team in the Blank Gameweek 29, rather than use his Free Hit as the great majority did. It's difficult to assess if that actually worked out or not, since he did manage exceptionally good scores both in GW29 and in GW34 when he made use of his saved Free Hit (71 and 86 points, respectively - pretty HUGE!); however, those results were again down to him having uncannily got all the right players in general, rather than the chip strategy per se; I'm not convinced that the lift he got by Free-Hitting in 34 outweighed even the points he sacrificed in 29, let alone the extra points he might have got with an optimum use of the FH in 29. The only 'advantage' he sought tactically was being able to play his Wildcard in GW30 instead of GW34 - but he really didn't make very good use of that.
His 'bonus chips' were an even more clearcut 'fail'. He went with Arne Slot for his 'Assistant Manager' from GW24 (perhaps just to get the damned thing out of the way, since its sprawling three-week duration was the most irksome aspect of the new chip and confounded the use of other chips in the final portion of the season). But Slot, of course, was famously - and not entirely unexpectedly - outpointed by his Merseyside rival David Moyes in that gameweek (the one where Liverpool and Everton both enjoyed an unexpected Double Gameweek as a result of the first Merseyside derby being rescheduled from early December because of gale-force winds); and, more importantly, he passed up the chance to play his Triple Captain on Mo Salah that week, who returned a season-highest 29 points. He switched to Oliver Glasner for a healthy 20-point return in the final week of the chip, after Slot had again disappointed somewhat in GW25. But a 48-point total for this chip, while pretty respectable, was far short of the maximum possible - a lot of people probably made 55-65 points from it. And its value was further undercut by having had to use a transfer on it, and by missing out on the Salah bonanza.
He eventually went with the other two bonus chips in consecutive weeks, the Triple Captain in GW32 and the Bench Boost in GW33. Isak produced a respectable 11 points for the TC - though since that was a Double Gameweek with two quite promising fixtures, it must have been a disappointing return. And it's very rarely worth using the captaincy, let alone the Triple Captain, on a 'forward'; there were other, better double-fixtures to aim for (not just for Mo Salah, although....). And his Bench Boost was a real damp squib, yielding a miserable 14 points.
So, he was 18 points below the optimum (and fairly obvious) Triple Captain pick, perhaps 10 or 15 off a best-possible AssMan score, and maybe 20 or 30 below a top Bench Boost return (and 5 or so below an adequate one). And he still trounced the other 10 million or so of us???
It is rather terrifying to reflect that, phenomenal as Lovro's season was, if he'd made a few better initial picks, done a bit better with his use and timing of the Wildcards, and got a stronger return from his bonus chips,... he might have cracked the 3,000-point ceiling!!!
Well, good on him, anyway! It just goes to show - you don't have to be PERFECT to win the title, or anywhere near.
But Lovro clearly isn't a super-genius; he's just an ordinary guy who happened to have a season where almost every second pick turned to gold for him. [You can read an interview with him by the Fantasy Football Scout website.]
He appears to be relatively new to the game, this being only the fifth year he's competed (at least on his present account). And he was pretty awful in the first two! But he seems to have 'got the hang of things' unusually quickly, as in 2022-23 and 2023-24 he was remarkably consistent, and got solid points and rank finishes - in the second 500,000 (which, I reckon, is about as good as you can hope to get without substantial slices of good fortune).
We can all take encouragement from this. Most good players in the game are hovering around the 2,350-point mark most years, rarely going up or down by more than about 75 points or so from that mean. I'd guess that's between one and two standard deviations (very hard to gauge, since neither 'luck' nor 'skill' in FPL follow a standard distribution!) To be the champion, you have to get up to about 5 standard deviations. And yes, Lovro suddenly jumped up by 440 points over his previous best this year! If he can do it, we all could. (We won't. But we could....)